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Willingness to defend one’s country  
and to resist in the Baltic states
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Abstract
This article addresses the question of willingness to defend one’s own country and a similar notion of resistance, should Latvia, Lithu-
ania and Estonia be attacked. The study principally relies on quantitative data from a dedicated nationally representative survey across 
all three countries. The data acquired thereof reaffirm findings from previous studies concluding that the highest level of willingness to 
defend one’s own country is in Estonia, while it is lower in Latvia and in Lithuania. Asked if and how respondents would resist in case 
of an attack, more willingness to resist either non-violently or violently was expressed by respondents in Lithuania, ahead of the number 
of willing to do so in Estonia and more so in Latvia. Demographic background of the respondents visualized and discussed in the article 
provides further nuances of both research questions. While situation with the willingness to defend Estonia is relatively comfortable, this 
should not be treated as a reason for complacency. There is still room for progress within some groups of the society. Meanwhile, valuable 
lessons could be drawn for policies of Latvia and more so of Lithuania to avert some of the less flattery trends identified in this study.
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The role of societies and their perceptions is a central element of the national security of every country. It is even more important in democratic societies – not just because the 
accountability of state institutions vis-à-vis societies is stronger and national security policies are 
subject to public opinion, but also because of the intrinsic vulnerabilities of democratic socie-
ties to intentional and unintentional external influences. An adversary can use various tools to 
influence public opinion, even more so in the digital age when access to individuals is easier 
than ever before. If such measures are successful, inhabitants of the target country might be less 
willing to defend their countries and to show resistance if their countries are occupied. This 
underscores the need to understand both the atmosphere in societies, as well as to plan and con-
duct measures to prevent external actors from succeeding in information and other operations. 
The Baltic states provide a peculiar case for studying the willingness of their inhabitants to 
defend their countries and to resist an adversary should they be attacked. All three countries 
have jittery relations with Russia. The latter is undoubtedly seen as a paramount source of 
risks to their national security, as exemplified by their basic national security documents 
(Seimas, 2017; Riigikogu, 2017; Saeima, 2019). Furthermore, all three constantly express 
concerns about Russia’s attempts to influence the perceptions of their societies in a way that 
Russia’s authorities would find beneficial. 
This article starts with a review of other Baltic-centric studies and an introduction to the re-
search approach and methods. That paves the way for presentation and analysis of the quan-
titative data – firstly on the willingness to defend the three countries, which is followed by the 
willingness to resist and how if the country was to be attacked. 
The main advantage of this article is the provision of methodologically consistent nationally rep-
resentative data from all three Baltic countries at the same time. Most of the other Baltic-centric 
researches relied on data acquired by different methodological approaches in diverging peri-
ods (e.g. Rutkauskas, 2018), or data on one Baltic country (e.g. Vileikienė and Janušauskienė, 
2016; Bērziņa and Zupa, 2020). Furthermore, the data not only provides a picture of the per-
ceptions in the societies at large, but also portrays opinions along demographic lines. 
Baltic states in the current research agenda 
The situation in the Baltic states has been explored in various global and regional-level surveys. At least one of the Baltic societies has been surveyed in the 1990 and 1999 
surveys of the European Values Study. Results for all three countries from 1990 revealed a 
high level of willingness – over four-fifths in all three (97.4 % in Latvia, 92.1 % in Estonia 
and 83.7 % in Lithuania); the 1999 edition only surveyed Lithuania, recording 72.1 % 
(European Values Study, 2013a, p. 561; 2013b, p. 916). The 1996 and 1997 World Values 
Survey data recorded willingness to fight for their own country at 61.3 % in Estonia, 54.5 
% in Latvia and 51 % in Lithuania; the 2011 survey placed Estonia at 51.6 % (Inglehart et 
al., 2014a; Inglehart et al., 2014b). Another survey of global reach, the WIN/Gallup Inter-
national Global Survey, assessed the situation in Latvia. It revealed that 41 % of respondents 
there would be willing to fight for their country (WIN/Gallup International, 2015, p. 2).
State institutions in the Baltics have also ordered surveys on the willingness to defend the 
respective countries. The publicly available surveys from 2001 to 2019 commissioned by the 
Estonian Ministry of Defence and by the Latvian Ministry of Defence for the period of 2014 
to 2016 are examples. Data from Latvia for the aforementioned period revealed that willing-
ness to defend the country was expressed by between 33 % and 41 % of respondents (SKDS, 
2016, p. 42). The more comprehensive Estonian data reveals that willingness to defend the 




country was in between 54 % and 70 %, with the highest values recorded from 2003 to 2005 
(Faktum Uuringukeskus, 2003b, p. 11; 2003a, p. 12; 2003c, p. 12; 2004a, p. 36; 2004b, p. 
37; 2004c, p. 21; 2005a, p. 41; 2005b, p. 41; 2005c, p. 51; Saar Poll 2011, p. 27; 2012a, 
p. 29; 2012b, p. 30; 2013a, p. 30; 2013b, p. 30; 2014, p. 29; Turu-uuringute 2001a, p. 9; 
2001b, p. 8; 2001c, p. 8; 2002a, p. 8; 2002b, p. 7; 2002c, p. 9; 2006a, p. 31; 2006b, p. 31; 
2006c, p. 42; 2007a, p. 31; 2007b, p. 35; 2008, p. 29; 2009a, p. 25; 2009b, p. 28; 2010a, p. 
27; 2010b, p. 36; 2011, p. 30; 2014, p. 28; 2016, p. 29; 2018, p. 32; 2019, p. 39). 
The topic has also been the subject of academic interest in the Baltics, focusing on these 
countries either trilaterally or individually. Rutkauskas (2018) assessed the situation in all 
three. He mainly relied on the data gathered as part of the European Values Study, World 
Values Survey and WIN/Gallup International Global Survey, though with additional data 
on Lithuania. His research thus revealed similar tendencies to the aforementioned primary 
sources. The supplementary data for Lithuania puts the willingness level at approximately 
one-third to two-thirds of the respondents (Rutkauskas, 2018, p. 54). 
There are several examples of research into individual Baltic states that should be noted. 
Vileikienė and Janušauskienė assessed data on the situation in Lithuania from several sourc-
es. The data, apart from that of the European Values Survey, placed the willingness level in 
Lithuania at between 32 % in 2005 and 57 % in 2014 (Vileikienė and Janušauskienė, 2016, 
p. 126). Meanwhile, a willingness level of 42 % in Lithuania was recorded in research by 
Ramonaitė, Petronytė-Urbonavičienė, Skirkevičius and Vosylius (2018). 
Andžāns, Sprūds and Bruģe (2017, pp. 17–18) presented data from a dedicated nationally 
representative survey in Latvia. They concluded that the results from that survey – 45.3 
% – fell beneath the average global level. A nationally representative survey as part of the 
study of Bērziņa and Zupa (2020, pp. 4–5) revealed that 31 % of Latvians would be ready 
to defend their country if there was a military attack, thus ranking Latvia among countries 
with a rather low willingness to defend one’s own country. Although a question on willing-
ness to defend Latvia by non-military means put that level at 55 %. 
Although the methodologies of the aforementioned studies differ, they tend to provide a 
generally consistent picture on willingness to defend the Baltic states. Willingness to de-
fend one’s country in the Baltics was higher in the first decade after independence. More 
recent data consistently demonstrates higher levels in Estonia, while Latvia and Lithuania 
fall behind in this respect.
Approach and methods of the study
For purposes of this study, a nationally representative sociological survey was conducted in all three Baltic States in November and December 2019. Interviews in Latvia were con-
ducted by SKDS (from 28 November to 8 December), in Lithuania by Baltijos Tyrimai (from 
14 to 27 November), and in Estonia by Turu-uuringute (from 28 November to 8 December).
Across all three countries, 2763 respondents aged from 18 to 74 completed interviews (870 
of them in Estonia, 1001 in Latvia, and 892 in Lithuania). The respondents were identified 
with the multi-stage proportional representation method. The demographic background of 
respondents included gender, age group, education level and language spoken in the family. 
Two questions were put to each respondent. First – “if [Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia] were 
attacked, should inhabitants of [Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia], in your opinion, take up 
arms to defend themselves in all situations, even if the outcome seemed uncertain?” Sec-
ond – “if [Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia] were attacked, what would you most likely do?”




The next chapter will focus on an analysis of answers to the first question (willingness 
to defend the country), while the following one will address the second question (will-
ingness and ways to resist). After assessing data on entire samples, the same data along 
demographic lines will be visualised and vetted. 
On the one hand, the data gathered and presented here has certain limitations. As an 
outcome of a single survey, they present a snapshot of the situation at the time of their 
gathering. Therefore, one should be careful with generalisations. On the other hand, this 
data is principally consistent with tendencies unveiled by other similar studies (most of 
them were outlined in the introduction, and it will be explained in the latter parts of the 
paper). On top of that, this study provides comparable and representative data as polling 
was conducted according to the same methodology and in an almost identical period.
Willingness to defend one’s country  
in the Baltic states
The first question asked in the survey was “if [Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia] were at-tacked, should inhabitants of [Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia], in your opinion, take up 
arms to defend themselves in all situations, even if the outcome seemed uncertain?” Each 
respondent could choose one predefined answer – “certainly yes”, “rather yes”, “rather no”, 
“certainly no” or “hard to say”. 
Figure 1 shows the data from all three Baltic states with regard to all respondents surveyed. The 
highest contrast can be observed between Estonia and Lithuania. Data from the first country 
demonstrates the greatest willingness to defend the country, whereas data from the second pro-
vides the lowest values. 38.3 % of all respondents in Estonia expressed definite approval of the 
question (“certainly yes”) and 28.3 % fair approval (“rather yes”) (66.6 % as a cumulative value). 
In Lithuania, only 4.2 % of respondents gave a definite positive answer to the same question, 
along with 25.7 % giving fair approval (29.9 % altogether). The situation in Latvia was in the 
middle with 20.5 % and 28.5 % positive answers accordingly (or 49 % as a cumulative value). 
Similar and adverse trends can be observed with the number of those respondents ex-
pressing no willingness to defend their country. The lowest such numbers are in Estonia 
(9.4 % saying a definite no and a further 12.7 % saying rather no (22.1 % in total)), but 
the highest such numbers in Lithuania (19.6 % definite no and 30.6 % rather no, or 50.2 
% in total). In Latvia, the respective numbers are 9.9 % and 21.6 % (31.5 % in total). 
Attention should also be devoted to the undecided respondents. The lowest number of 
undecideds were in Estonia (11.2 %). There were almost twice as many undecided re-
spondents in Lithuania (19.9 %) and Latvia (19.6 %). Figure 1. Willingness to defend one’s 
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Data on the demographic background of the respondents provides a more detailed picture. 
It provides an insight along the lines of gender, age, main language spoken in the family, as 
well as the education level of respondents. 
In the deliberations that follow, more attention is given to the trends that cannot be directly 
seen from the figures, thus in part avoiding duplication of the visuals and words. More 
emphasis is placed on the affirmative values (willingness to defend) as it is similarly placed 
in the forefront in various global level studies (e.g. WIN/Gallup International, 2015, p. 2). 
In other words, how many individuals are willing to defend their country, not how many 
are not willing to do so.
Figure 2 shows the data dividing individuals by gender. In all three countries, male re-
spondents expressed willingness to defend their country more often than women did. 
Trends across all three countries are similar in terms of the difference between men and 
women giving cumulative affirmative answers: 10.6 % higher in Estonia, 10.9 % in 
Lithuania and 8.4 % in Latvia (in other words, the percentage is approximately 10 % 
higher when data between male and female respondents is compared). Curiously, a higher 
percentage of women in Estonia expressed willingness to defend their country than the 
percentage of men in both Lithuania and Latvia.
Data in terms of age of the respondents is not visualised in this article due to the large 
amount of information (it provides separate data in age groups from 18 to 24, 25 to 
34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 63 and 64 to 74). Results from Latvia are more balanced 
as in all of the pre-defined age groups, cumulative willingness to defend the country is 
above two-fifths; the highest level was registered among those aged from 45 to 54 (54.7 
%), while the lowest among those aged from 64 to 74 (43.3 %). Meanwhile, data from 
Lithuania demonstrates that the highest cumulative levels of willingness are among the 
youngest respondents, aged from 18 to 24 (39.6 %), while the lowest among respondents 
in the age group of 55 to 63 (20.1 %). Data from Estonia, as opposed to Lithuania, sug-
gests that the elderly are the most willing to defend their country. There, 74.4 % of those 
aged 64 and above provided an affirmative answer. The lowest percentage of cumulative 
positive answers, yet demonstrating a decent level of willingness, came from respondents 
aged from 18 to 24 (54.3 %). 
Figure 3 shows data based on the language spoken in respondents’ families – these were 
Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, or Russian. Attention to this perspective is necessary given 
the often-observed different opinions among Russian-speakers on such issues as the for-
eign and defence policy of the Baltic states. For example, a research and an underlying 
nationally representative survey in Latvia revealed contrasting perceptions of the friendli-
est/non-friendliest countries and their leaders. Among Russian speakers, the most non-
Figure 2. Willingness to defend one’s 
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friendly country was the United States (to be fair, Russia came second), while the presi-
dent of Russia would enjoy the highest trust should a crisis occur (Andžāns et al., 2017, 
pp. 30, 28). The reality is more complex than that, and this study aims to give a further 
insight in the issue of polarisation of these societies.
From this perspective, the highest contrast can be seen in Estonia, where the difference in 
willingness to defend the country among Estonian-speakers and Russian-speakers stands 
at 26.1 % (the difference among cumulative positive answers in one and the other group). 
In Latvia, the number is 15 %. In Lithuania, the difference among respondents speaking 
either Lithuanian or Russian in their families is the lowest of all three – 3.8 %. The case 
of Lithuania differs from the other two countries given the overall smaller number of 
Russian speakers there, which accordingly resulted in the smaller sample size of Russian 
speakers in this survey (50 respondents). 
Even though there is a notable difference in two of the countries, the level of those re-
spondents speaking Russian in their families and willing to defend their countries is, 
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The final figure of this chapter, no 4, shows the data on the education level of the 
respondents. In a cumulative perspective, the most willing to defend their country in all 
three countries are those with secondary or secondary professional education. The biggest 
difference among categories of different education levels was observed in Lithuania, where 
a considerably smaller number of respondents with basic education were willing to defend 
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Figure 3. Willingness to defend one’s 
country in the Baltic states: language 
spoken in family
Figure 4. Willingness to defend one’s 
country in the Baltic states: education
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While the first question addressed the willingness of respondents to defend their coun-
try, the next chapter will explore a related, though separate issue of willingness and 
form of resistance, should the situation assumed in the first question materialise. 
Willingness and forms of resistance  
in the Baltic states
The second question put to each respondent of the survey was “if [Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia] were attacked, what would you most likely do?” The pre-defined an-
swers proposed to respondents were “would remain and continue living as usual (would 
neither collaborate nor resist)”; “would remain and resist non-violently (e.g. taking part 
in protests)”; “would try to flee the country”; “would remain and resist violently (e.g. 
by attacking the new authorities)”; “would remain and support the new power (e.g. by 
participating in the work of the new authorities, by assisting with ensuring order)”; and 
“hard to say”. For space saving purposes, the parts of the answers in the brackets are de-
liberately omitted from the figures that follow in this chapter. 
Figure 5 shows the data on all respondents participating in the survey. Compared to the 
first question, more respondents had difficulties in providing an answer to this question. 
Similar to the first question, the number of undecideds is the lowest in Estonia. 
Among all respondents, the highest cumulative level of willingness to resist was reg-
istered in Lithuania (36.9 %), ahead of Estonia (33.8 %). The number in Latvia was 
19.8 %. Data from Latvia also reveals the lowest values in both violent and non-violent 
resistance forms. 
As Figure 6 demonstrates, compared to Latvia, in both Lithuania and Estonia there 
would be twice as many those willing to resist violently. The highest percentage of those 
ready to live as usual was recorded in Latvia. The level of those that would support a new 
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In the explanations that follow, we focus on the willingness to resist, either violently or 
non-violently; nevertheless, the contrary values are not entirely neglected. 
Figure 6 shows the data divided by gender. In Latvia and Estonia, any form of willing-
ness of resistance was more frequently expressed by men, while the situation was the 
opposite in Lithuania. In other words, more women than men would be ready to resist 
both violently and non-violently in Lithuania. In Estonia and Lithuania, the respective 
Figure 5. Willingness to resist in the 
Baltic states: all respondents
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difference in percentage between genders (willing or not willing to resist) is almost two-
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In the same manner as in the previous chapter, data regarding the respondents’ age is not 
visualised due to the amount of information generated by multiple age groups. Data from 
Latvia suggests that the most willing to express any manner of resistance are the youngest 
adult members of the population (aged between 25 and 34, with a cumulative willingness 
level of roughly 34 %), while the willingness to resist becomes lower among older people 
(the lowest among respondents aged above 55 – around 12 %). In Lithuania, however, 
greater levels of willingness to resist can be seen among the elderly (50.3 % among those 
aged above 64), while the lowest among those aged from 18 to 24 (19.9 %). In Estonia, 
the situation is more balanced among different age groups as the level of willingness to 
resist is above three-tenths in all age groups – from 30.5 % among the oldest to 39.9 % 
among the youngest. When the willingness to resist with non-violent and violent means 
is differentiated, data from all three countries suggests generally greater levels of willing-
ness to resist violently among younger respondents and lower levels among the older ones.
 
Figure 7 shows the data based on the language spoken in respondents’ families. Peculiarly, 
the cumulative willingness to resist in Latvia and Lithuania was higher among Russian 
speaking respondents with the difference among the groups of 2.7 % and 14.7 % in Latvia 
and Lithuania accordingly; with respect to Lithuania, the issue of the limited sample size 
mentioned in the previous chapter has to be reiterated. In Estonia, on the contrary, more 
Estonian-speakers expressed willingness to resist (24.8 % more than Russian-speakers).
Figure 6. Willingness to resist in the 
Baltic states: gender
Figure 7. Willingness to resist in 
the Baltic states: language spoken 
in the family
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Figure 8 contains the answers of respondents based on their education level. The data 
provides a rather balanced picture among the three pre-defined education levels. In all 
three countries, resistance of any form was more often expressed by individuals with basic 
education, though that level is rather balanced among the categories. 
Conclusions
Even though this study is principally based on a single survey, its national representa-tiveness, unified methodological approach and parallel timing provides a notable in-
sight into the societal attitudes towards defence of the countries in question. Trends of the 
average willingness to defend one’s own country identified here are principally corrobo-
rated by other studies from recent years. Since 2014, when the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 
also inflamed insecurity in the Baltic states, the highest level of willingness to defend one’s 
country has been consistently recorded in Estonia (Saar Poll 2014, p. 29; Turu-uuringute 
2014, p. 28; 2016, p. 29; 2018, p. 32; 2019, p. 39), ahead of the respective level in Latvia 
(WIN/Gallup International, 2015, p. 2; SKDS, 2016, p. 42; Andžāns et al., 2017, p. 17; 
Bērziņa and Zupa, 2020, p. 5) and Lithuania (Vileikienė and Janušauskienė, 2016, p. 
126; Ramonaitė, Petronytė-Urbonavičienė, Skirkevičius and Vosylius, 2018). 
Data from the nationally representative survey of this study, conducted in 2019, similarly 
suggests that the greatest willingness to defend one’s own country in the Baltics is in Esto-
nia, ahead of Latvia and Lithuania. Willingness to defend Estonia, standing at two-thirds 
of respondents, is more than twice as high as the respective level in Lithuania. In the lat-
ter, only every third respondent expressed willingness to defend the state. 
The first question of the survey addressed general willingness to defend one’s own coun-
try. The demographic background of the respondents indicates that in all three countries, 
male respondents are more ready to defend their country than women (the amplitude be-
tween genders in all three was almost identical). The situation is more diverse among the 
countries in terms of age groups. In Latvia, the results across different age groups do not 
differ significantly. In Lithuania, greater levels of willingness to defend can be seen among 
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the youngest, while in Estonia among the elderly. When the impact of the main language 
of the family of respondents is assessed, data from all three suggests that Russian speakers 
are less willing to defend their country. While the difference in this aspect is minimal in 
Lithuania, it is contrary in Latvia and more so in Estonia. The remaining demographic 
indicator – the education level – suggests that the most willing to defend their country in 
all three countries are those with secondary or secondary professional education. 
The second question of the survey addressed the reactions of the respondents assuming 
their country had already been attacked. Compared to the first question, more respond-
ents had difficulties providing an answer to the question. The highest cumulative level of 
those willing to resist was registered among respondents in Lithuania, slightly ahead of 
Estonia. The same number was smaller in Latvia, where the lowest values in both violent 
and non-violent resistance forms were observed. Also, the highest percentage of those 
willing to continue living as usual was recorded in Latvia. The level of respondents that 
would support the adversary was equally low in all three countries.
From a demographic perspective, in both Latvia and Estonia, the willingness to engage 
in any form of resistance was more frequently expressed by men, while the situation was 
opposite in Lithuania. Peculiarly, the cumulative willingness to resist in Latvia and Lithu-
ania was higher among Russian speaking respondents, contrary to Estonia. The attitudes 
by education levels suggest a generally balanced outlook among different backgrounds in 
all three countries. Although resistance of either form would be more often expressed by 
individuals with basic education.
The findings of this study should be brought to the attention of policy makers in the 
respective countries, given their comprehension of the importance that societal attitudes 
play in state defence as a whole. First of all, societal attitudes towards state defence should 
not be neglected at any time. These should be measured on a regular basis, as it is com-
prehensively and transparently done in Estonia. Authorities in Latvia and Lithuania, as 
well as other countries, could take this approach as an example as a part of their national 
security risk assessments. 
Secondly, not only should societal attitudes towards willingness to defend one’s own 
country and to resist be measured, they should also be followed up by measures to tackle 
the negative tendencies they indicate. While the situation regarding the willingness to 
defend the country is relatively comfortable in Estonia, this should not be treated as a rea-
son for complacency. There is still room for progress within certain groups of the society, 
especially among the Russian speakers. Valuable lessons could be drawn for the policies of 
Latvia and more so of Lithuania to avert some of the negative trends regarding willingness 
to defend the countries. For Latvia, similarly to Estonia, one of the main issues to address 
is the lower level of willingness to defend the country among Russian speakers. A more 
comprehensive assessment and action should be considered in Lithuania to strengthen 
the willingness of its inhabitants not only to resist, but also to be ready defend the country 
in the first place.
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